Psychological & Cultural Bases of International Politics: Essay

Diplomatic Effects of International Rhetoric: The Case of Ehime Maru Accident



1. Introduction

On February 9 in 2001, the Greeneville, a 6,080-ton nuclear-powered attack submarine, hit and sank the 499-ton Ehime Maru, a training ship from Uwajima Fisheries High School in Ehime Prefecture, Japan, off the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The Greeneville was conducting an emergency surfacing drill for its civilian guests on board. The Ehime Maru was carrying 35 people including students, teachers and crews. Nine were dead out of them.

Soon after the accident, when 9 missing people were already presumed dead, how the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. President, should apologize to the bereaved families became a central focus of the problem. The bereaved families required the harshest punishment on the captain of the Greeneville, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, and holding a court-martial. They also demanded a direct apology from Mr. Waddle. The Japanese government followed them. The then chief cabinet secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, said that the Japanese government could press for “strict disciplinary steps on the U.S. side.” (French, 2001)

On the U.S. side, the problem was not so easy. The President George W. Bush dispatched a special envoy and the envoy apologized to representatives of the bereaved. Adm. William J. Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, also met the families at the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Tokyo to apologize for the accident. However, the U.S. Navy didn’t allow Mr. Waddle to meet the families and apologize soon after the accident. According to Fallon, there is a “cultural difference” between the U.S. and Japan.

In Japan, no matter what the circumstances are...the culture demands an apology. That is not the case in the United States. There is a presumption of innocence until (a person is) proved guilty. (Japan Times, March 1, 2001)

If this is true, I can say a cultural difference between the two countries resulted in escalating antipathy of the bereaved toward the U.S. because what they wanted most was a sincere and face-to-face apology from Mr. Waddle himself. Undoubtedly, there is a huge gap between the two countries of the way apologies should be expressed. Moreover, whether the two countries can settle a conflict depends on what kind of rhetoric the assailant side is using to express its apology.

In a similar context, Jim Schnell refers to the “distinction between East and West cultural bases” (Schnell, 2003, pp.78-9) which was made explicit in the negotiation between the U.S. and China over the collision of a U.S. surveillance plane with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet 100km off the coast of China. The two countries went through a tough negotiation to agree on what rhetoric should be used to settle the conflict. For, “China, as an eastern culture, tends to be more shame oriented and the US, as a western culture, tends to be more guilt oriented” From the beginning of the negotiation, both countries disagreed on the choice of appropriate words the U.S. would adopt to express apology. If this toughness came from a cultural difference (in this case, difference of rhetoric), we can’t avoid focusing on diplomatic effects of rhetoric in discussing conflict resolution. I shall examine in this paper how change of attitudes and rhetoric can lead to change of the way conflicts are resolved. By using the Ehime Maru incident, I will focus on psychological, cultural difference between Japan and the U.S.


2. Difference of Rhetoric: “I'm Sorry”

Some people call Japanese culture as “culture of apology.” The Japanese often use the phrase “Sumimasen” whose literal meaning is “I'm sorry,” but what the speaker really means depends on situations. “Excuse me” is also translated as “Sumimasen” in Japanese. Sometimes when the Japanese wants to express a feeling of gratitude, they say “Sumimasen” instead of saying “Thank you.” The expression for “I'm sorry” in Japanese has a much wider range of meaning than English. Needless to say, “I'm sorry” “Excuse me” and “Thank you” have quite different meanings with each other in English.

According to Kenji Kitao and Katherine S. Kitao,

the Japanese often apologize not because they think they are wrong but because they want to maintain good relationships with acquaintances. Even though it's nobody's fault, when something bad happens and it's not clear who should be responsible, they use expressions of apology without any intension to apologize. (Kitao, 1990)

Kitao continues.

But Americans only use expressions of regret, and when they apologize, they do so only for their own responsibility ... If they don't have any responsibility for what happens or do have a partial responsibility, they make it clear when they apologize.

While the Japanese use expressions of apology in various situations for various reasons, Americans limit the range of situation in which they should apologize. One of the reasons for this contrast can be derived from the difference of social contexts between the two countries. If you show apology with a light heart in an American society, it means you accept responsibility and admit that it's your fault. It might make you bear legal liability and pay huge amounts of reparation. In Japan, that is not the case. People apologize not for clarification of their own responsibility, but for keeping personal relationships.

This contrast appeared in the Ehime Maru case. As mentioned above, the U.S. Navy didn't give Mr. Waddle permission to meet the bereaved families soon after the accident and offer face-to-face apology for fear that his personal apology would lead to the questioning of the Navy's responsibility as a whole. However, the families desired a direct contact with Mr. Waddle and wanted to hear his apology from the bottom of the heart. If Mr. Waddle had come to meet the families much earlier and express sorry, all the families might have accepted his remorse for the accident. He visited Japan in December 2002, nearly two years after the sinking of the Ehime Maru. But some of the families refused to meet him. The Japan Times editorial said that

it has been hard to avoid the perception that Mr. Waddle dallied for another 14 months out of fear of liability, both his own and that of the U.S. Navy, which has been negotiating a settlement with the survivors and families.

As the months went by, the feeling grew that it might even be better if he didn’t come at all[.] (The Japan Times, “A belated but welcome apology" December 19, 2002)

It is evident that both countries have different values on how apology should be expressed. While the Japanese evaluated apology in terms of “human” and emotional features, Americans tend to settle with the victims in a more practicable way. As I wrote, however, “I'm sorry” in Japanese covers a wider range of meaning than English and Japanese people use the phrase in a carefree way. Thus, they are less likely to be satisfied with expressions of apology only. They want more. The phrase “I'm sorry” can be taken more seriously in the U.S. than in Japan. This gap, in turn, caused frustration on the U.S. side. For instance, Richard Cohen, Washington Post columnist, wrote an article titled “We've Apologized Enough to Japan,” and complained about Japanese endless calls for apologies.

Their parents are in agony ... They are permitted to say anything they want, to demand anything that will salve their grief ... But other Japanese―everyone from editorial writers to opportunistic politicians―are demanding more than they are entitled to. The constant calls for more and more apologies. The implications that, somehow, the Americans are unfeeling and cavalier about the loss of Japanese life. These are calumnies. The collision was a tragedy, but it was an accident. The Greenville was not even in Japanese waters―it was off Hawaii. If the Greenville was being reckless, it was more than likely that American lives would have been in danger. (The Washington Post, 2001/2/27)

Cohen also criticized Japanese attitudes as “epic hypocrisy” pointing out the fact that the Japanese government has never apologized for “comfort women” “Rape of Nanking” and so on. In contrast, he referred to the U.S. as “the most apologetic of nations.”

We are sorry for just about everything. Bill Clinton apologized in Africa for the enslavement of that continent’s black people―and he should have. We have apologized to the Indians of this continent and to this or that group which, in the past, was once a victim of discrimination and injustice. If you’re wrong, you say you’re sorry. But it’s hard to apologize for an accident.

It seems quite interesting to me because it endorses the difference of the extent to which Americans and the Japanese place values on the words “I'm sorry.” It also shows in general that each of conflicting countries tend to see itself as one who has a good intention.


3. Difference of Political Cultures: How Leaders Should Take Their Responsibility

Another interesting viewpoint is the difference of political cultures between the U.S. and Japan, which was pointed out by a Washington Post article:

Japanese political culture insists on accountability by leaders for mistakes and disasters, as Mr. Mori's [then Prime Minister] predicament demonstrates; unfortunately, the trend in the U.S. military has been in the other direction. Despite promises of action, no one has been held accountable for the intelligence and command failures that led to the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbor last fall[.] (The Washington Post, “An Ailing Partner” February 26, 2001)

Despite the difference of political cultures, a special envoy dispatched by President Bush and Adm. William J. Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, met the families directly and apologized for the Ehime Maru accident. This might have been the product of giving special consideration to Japanese political culture. But in general, there also exists the difference in the way of taking responsibility for an accident. In the U.S., if it is truly an unexpected accident, it would be nobody's fault. Leaders don't need to take responsibility for that because the accident is not their fault. For example, after the space shuttle Challenger exploded at a height of 46,000 feet after launched from Kennedy Space Center in Florida on January 28, 1986, nobody required for resignation of President Reagan. That was an accident in any sense. But even though it is an accident and is never the fault on their own side, people in Japan will question leaders' responsibility like in the case of the Ehime Maru. After the incident, then Prime Minister Mori took responsibility for it and resigned.

There is a different view on how leaders should take responsibility for a tragic accident between two nations. This difference was one reason to cause negative feelings of the victims' families in the Ehime Maru sinking. As the article of the Washington Post pointed out, “Despite promises of action, no one has been held accountable for the intelligence and command failures”. In Japan's political arena, the opposite has happened. The Prime Minister was forced to resign. It is natural for the Japanese that leaders take responsibility. Therefore, when the U.S. Navy decided to honorably discharge Mr. Waddle and not to hold a court-martial, the bereaved families expressed dissatisfaction and strong anger. The families couldn’t accept the Navy’s decision even though Mr. Waddle spoke like the following in a TV interview:

What the Japanese culture doesn't understand (is) had this gone to a court-martial, the rules of evidence are such that it more than likely would have resulted in an acquittal and that would have further enraged the Japanese population. (The Japan Times, April 28, 2001.)

Even though Mr. Waddle sought the understanding of the Japanese public, saying his punishment and upcoming retirement are far harsher than being court-martialed, the difference of political cultures prevented the families and the whole Japanese from being satisfied with the Navy’s decision.


4. “American-Japanese Negotiations”

What is also interesting is different views on negotiation styles between the U.S. and Japan. As Tenhover points out, “While Americans may approach negotiation as a “highly competitive game,”” and “place a high value on winning, and competition is an essential component” of American socialization process, “The typical Japanese negotiation style is characterized by intuition, indirectness, disguising or suppressing real feelings, persistence, avoidance of self praise and diligent information-gathering about the other side's needs and intentions.” Moreover, “The Japanese are rarely argumentative, even when correct. They avoid confrontation and its perceived damage to personal relations.” On the other hand, the American approach to negotiation is “more impersonal, allowing for freedom to be argumentative whether right or wrong.” (Tenhover, 1998, pp.537-9)

If we apply this contrast to the Ehime Maru incident, meeting with the bereaved families directly has a different meaning for the U.S. from meeting with Mr. Waddle for the families. If, for Americans, the purpose of negotiation is to decide whether right or wrong, this situation offers no room for negotiation. There was the possibility that the range of responsibility would expand unlimitedly on the U.S. side. For the Japanese, however, competitive characteristics of negotiation are considered weak. The bereaved families never expected to negotiate for, say, as high an amount of reparation as possible when they would meet Mr. Waddle. Rather, they placed importance on a ritualistic, personal and face-saving aspect of negotiation. They didn't desire practical benefits. As Tenhover says,

Saving face is crucial in Japan, and decisions can be made on the basis of saving a person or group embarrassment. Meanwhile, American decisions often disregard face-saving, and tend to be made more on a strict cost-benefit basis.” (pp.539-40)

If I use Schnell's words, Japan, as an eastern culture, tends to be more shame oriented, as opposed to the U.S. who, as a western culture, tends to be more guilt oriented.

The traditional style and values of negotiation made a difference for the settlement of the Ehime Maru accident. Since the U.S. Navy was reluctant to allow Mr. Waddle to meet the families and construct personal relations with them, the families and the Japanese in general thought of it as humiliating. That’s why some of the families refused to meet Mr. Waddle when he came to Japan almost two years later since the accident. Because the U.S. saw negotiation with a direct contact as contentious, the Navy couldn't understand what the families really wanted.

Quite a lot of books have been published about the difference of negotiation style between Japan and other countries, especially about business negotiation. One of the most common observations is that the Japanese “seem to treat negotiation almost as a ritualistic enactment of an agreement which has been hammered out behind the scenes.” “In American negotiations, individuals or small groups often have the authority to change positions; we enjoy bargaining and assume the process of give-and-take takes place at the negotiating table, not behind the scenes.” (Tenhover, p.537, 539) It does not mean that negotiation is not important for the Japanese. It is for the purpose of face-saving in hierarchical Japan.


5. Conclusion: Diplomatic Effects of International Rhetoric

From the chapters so far, it is obvious that rhetorical and cultural differences between the U.S. and Japan complicated the settlement of this tragic accident and escalated antipathy with each other. We can derive some lessons from this incident on diplomatic effects of international rhetoric.

First of all, we need to choose rhetoric which is appropriate to occasions. The meaning and seriousness of particular rhetoric differ according as culture. Even though what the rhetoric means is almost identical, people from different cultures might receive the impression of the rhetoric quite differently. Even if Americans say “I’m sorry,” it is probable that the Japanese don’t think it’s enough.

Secondly, we need to be careful of the difference of political cultures and values. A shame-oriented culture has a quite different perspective on rhetoric and negotiation process from a guilt-oriented culture. Munz’s definition of rhetoric seems quite typical of a western cultural perspective: “Rhetoric is important when there are no universal standards of truth and when relative positions are competing for supporters.” (Munz, 1990) In contrast, in an eastern culture, rhetoric is used for saving pride of both sides of negotiation.

When Mr. Waddle came to Japan to apologize to the families, he was criticized for coming late. As I said, some of the families turned down his offer to meet them. But when he appeared on TV and apologized to the Japanese public crying in front of a TV camera, many Japanese felt sympathy for him. The Japan Times editorial showed welcome to his apology. “[I]t is obvious from everything Mr. Waddle has said and done since the day of the sinking that the experience has been nothing less than traumatic for him. His words both before and during this week’s emotional visit leave no room to doubt the sincerity of his remorse.” (The Japan Times, 2002) Emotional rhetoric and attitudes are more appealing to the Japanese than practical negotiation for compensation. It seems highly likely that American people would not react in the same way. Crying in front of a TV camera might be considered shameful in the context of American culture. Change of attitudes (directly meeting the families) with emotional rhetoric (crying in front of a TV camera) contributed to successful efforts for conflict resolution. At least on the level of the public, it surely improved the image of Mr. Waddle and mitigated antipathy of the Japanese toward the U.S.



References

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French, Howard W. (2001) “Sub Accident Shakes Japan’s Security Ties With U.S.” The New York Times, February 23, 2001.
The Japan Times (2002) “Editorial: A belated but welcome apology” December 19, 2002. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?ed20021219a1.htm
Kelman, Herbert C. (1986) “An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolution” edited by Ralph White, Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War: A Book of Readings, New York: New York University Press.
Kitao, Kenji & Katherine S. Kitao. (1990) “apology (Shazai)” http://ilc2.doshisha.ac.jp/users/kkitao/japanese/library/kyozai/culture/a/apology.htm
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The Washington Post (2001/2/26) “An Ailing Partner”.
The Washington Post (2001/2/27) “We’ve Apologized Enough to Japan”.