Theories of Comparative and International Studies: Essay

Q. Can democracy be imposed? Those who answer no tend to cite "democratic culture" as a necessary feature. Does the history of Europe and Africa, as portrayed by Tilly and Reno suggest that "culture" is the main determinant of democratic stability? If not, what is the most critical feature of successful democracies? What would need to occur for democracy to be successful in countries that have not had 1,000 years of bloody warfare?

A. In some cases democracy can be imposed, but can't in other cases. However, what makes that difference is not necessarily “democratic culture.” At least in Tilly's and Reno's books, culture is not taken as a dominant factor. When some people say that “culture” is the main determinant of democratic stability, they often have Islamic countries in mind. They might point out “undemocratic feature of Islam” and conclude that Islamic countries can't establish democracy within them. But history of Europe and Africa the two authors describe suggests that critical factors of democratic stability are related to social, economic factors, rather than cultural ones. Tilly mentions that European countries during the age of “specialization” had to extract resources needed for war making from their citizens in exchange for such benefits as social insurance, veterans' pensions, public education and housing. This extraction was so heavy a burden for the citizens that the ruler was forced to respond to their resistance and make many bargains to gain agreements. “Those bargains generally incorporated the governing bodies into the state, and turned them into representative institutions.” (p.102) The concession by the ruler led to central strong bureaucratic apparatuses and a particular state institution. Therefore, the critical determinant of democracy was the powerful middle-class citizens who could make sustained resistance to the ruler’s extraction for war making, rather than “democratic culture.”

In Tilly's book, war mobilization is the greatest factor for the formation of state and its institutions. But war mobilization didn’t have influence upon all states in the same way. If countries experience a lot of wars, as evident in European history, democracy (or establishment of the strong middle-class) can be developed far more rapidly through war mobilization. However, in Latin American countries that, even if they are different type of wars from those in Europe, have experienced a lot of wars for 500-year history since their independence, they shaped quite different types of democracy and ran through different paths from European cases. This shows that there are various intervening variables in shaping democracy.

Moreover, the continuum between capital and coercion is important for the formation of representative institutions in Europe. Tilly says “[T]he coercion-intensive, capital-intensive and capitalized coercion paths led to very different kinds of states. Even after convergence, states retained some features—for example, the character of their representative institutions—that clearly reflected their earlier historical experiences.” (p.31) Where a state stands on the continuum is also critical for democratization.

In African cases, Reno mentions that although societal groups were not necessarily absent in African countries “the capacity of organized groups to force rulers to heed their demands” (p.218) was hopelessly weak. African leaders didn’t need legitimization by the domestic population to make war preparation due to their ability to sell commodities on the international market and gain military aid from great powers. African leaders didn't care about prosperity of their own countries and welfare of the population. This was made possible by availability of foreign aid and loans especially during the Cold War era. This weakness of “civil society” and the absence of strong middle-class citizens thwarted establishment of democracy. This resulted from political condition at the time, rather than from cultural features of African countries themselves.
Economic development of a certain level is one of the things that need to occur in a country in order to construct strong middle-class citizens. Economic growth and accumulated capitals can give the population more power to resist rulers, and their growing capacity to resist rulers' extraction might lead to prevalence of pluralistic ideas among people. That can be the beginning of the formation of democracy.

Although ideas and culture play almost no role in Tilly's and Reno's book, J. Samuel Valenzuela refers to much wider variety of factors including class, religion, political-institutional strictures, actors' conceptions regarding what makes government legitimate, and so on. Valenzuela argues against Barrington Moore's exclusive stress on classes as a factor of democratization by referring to a Chilean case and advocates complexity of factors for democratization. According to Valenzuela, the political actors who advanced democratization were associated with a wide variety of interests that could vary case by case, and “The variations in terms of who these actors were and how they were organized affected the kinds of democracies that were formed, their overall stability, the characteristics of their party systems, and the shape of their social interest organizations.” (p.268) For instance, when Conservative Parity in Chile tried to prevent further secularization, the religious-secular divide became a critical factor in generating democratizing actors. But in other Latin American countries, “regional elites, linguistic minorities, working-class groups, peasant societies, business associations, and so on, may have been significant.” (p.268) Some of significant features for democratization are, in these cases, cultural. Therefore, even though there are countries that have not had 1,000 years of bloody warfare as Europeans and Africans have, successful democracy can be established and stabilized in diverse situations due to diverse factors. But tensions and conflicts in a society over class or religion are highly likely to promote collective actions among the population and make change more rapid. Latin America established democratic institutions with much fewer wars with external enemies than Europe. But the most critical factor of successful democracy varies according to timing, place and conditions of each country. It is highly context-dependent and it is hard to identify only single critical factor.